Romanov Grigory Vasilievich
(02/07/1923). Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU from 03/05/1976 to 07/01/1985. Candidate to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU from 04/27/1973 to 05/03/1976 Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU from 06/19/83 to 01/01/1985 Member of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1966 - 1986 Member of the CPSU since 1944
Born in the village of Zikhnovo, Borovichi district, Novgorod region in a peasant family. Russian. Since 1938 he studied at a technical school. During the Great Patriotic War at the front, he was severely shell-shocked and frostbite. In 1946 - 1954 worked as a designer, head of sector of the Central Design Bureau of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry. In 1953 he graduated in absentia from the Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute. In 1954 - 1961 Secretary of the party committee of the plant, secretary, first secretary of the Kirov district party committee of the city of Leningrad. In 1961 - 1963 Secretary of the Leningrad City Committee, Secretary of the Regional Party Committee. From 1963 to 1970, the second secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU. According to I. D. Laptev, who was then working in the magazine “Communist”, he was struck by the cabinet of G. V. Romanov, who held the post of second secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU: “The cabinet was practically empty - no bookcases with books, or samples of products from Leningrad enterprises, nor any models of airplanes, tanks, boats that adorned the workdays of many Soviet chiefs. The most striking thing about Romanov’s desktop. Not in size - a regular stationery table covered in green cloth. But absolutely empty! Not a book, not a newspaper, not a folder with papers, not a stand with a fountain pen, not a desk calendar - nothing! It was as if he had just been delivered from the store and had not yet had time to arrange it ”(I. Laptev, Power Without Glory. M., 2002. P. 32). In 1970, he was elected First Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU. The first secretary of the Leningrad city committee of the CPSU G.I. Popov was also considered for this position, but after long hesitations, his candidacy was withdrawn. He showed himself on the positive side. In Leningrad, under his leadership, issues of accelerating scientific and technological progress were actively addressed, the first production associations (firms) arose and strengthened in the country, comprehensive planning of socio-economic development at enterprises became widespread. He was demanding of abusers. Unlike other regions, the leading cadres of Leningrad were not corrupt. When G.V. Romanov headed the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU, he forbade to mention his name in newspaper reports on official ceremonies in which he took part on duty. Some viewed this not as modesty, but as foresight. He lived in an ordinary city house, not standing out among other tenants. A neighbor on the floor above regularly flooded him with water due to a malfunction in the water supply. French President V. J. d'Estaing in his memoirs “Power and Life” (M., 1990. S. 134 - 136), with reference to a friend of L. I. Brezhnev, Polish leader E. Gerek, wrote that L. I. Brezhnev in 1976 he saw G.V. Romanov as his successor. After this information, d'Estaing asked to be constantly informed of the activities of G.V. Romanov and sent him invitations during the visits of the French president to the USSR. But in 1980, E. Gierek informed d’Esthene that L. I. Brezhnev’s intention had changed, that he would read K. Chernenko as his successor. The elderly M. A. Suslov and A. N. Kosygin prepared him for the future management of the party and the state in their place. To this end, he was introduced, as an equal member, into the Politburo of the Central Committee, where his predecessor V.S. Tolstikov was not allowed, although he dreamed about it. However, with the election of 48-year-old M.S. Gorbachev at the suggestion of Yu. V. Andropov in 1979 as a candidate for membership in the Politburo, and in 1980, the age-old advantage of 57-year-old G.V. Romanov faded as a member of the Politburo. At the suggestion of Yu. V. Andropov, he was transferred to Moscow. In 1983 - 1985 Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for Defense. He was one of the contenders for the post of Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee. However, inexperienced in hardware combinations, from the first days of his stay in the Central Committee he was isolated. According to V. I. Boldin, he could not rise to the level of national problems and for a long time he operated on the scale of a large city and region. He was neither a prominent political figure, nor an eloquent speaker. At meetings of the Politburo and the Secretariat, the Central Committee was more silent. And even if he spoke, then he behaved exactly, unlike M. S. Gorbachev, did not seek attention from senior colleagues and did not seek to impress them with non-standard judgments. He did not achieve popularity with the party asset. But he was put forward by forces opposing M. S. Gorbachev. Losing to him the ability to seem like it was profitable. In terms of political positions, experience, and ability to organize a business, he was clearly stronger; he could compete with M. S. Gorbachev, which he could not allow. Fearing the arrival of G.V. Romanov to power, his powerful opponents launched a subtle backstage fight against him. K.U. Chernenko and D.F. Ustinov were informed about the dangerous alliance of the Secretary of the Central Committee for Defense Affairs G.V. Romanov and the Chief of the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov. D.F. Ustinov, who suspected that N.V. Ogarkov was marking the place of the Minister of Defense, persuaded K.U. Chernenko to create the High Command of the directions and transfer the Chief of the General Staff to the High Command of the Western direction. As a result, N.V. Ogarkov lost real power on a military scale, and G.V. Romanov began to slowly recede into the background. In the apparatus of the Central Committee, they talked about the coolness of G.V. Romanov and the democracy of M.S. Gorbachev. A false provocative rumor was launched that at the wedding of his daughter G.V. Romanov allowed to use the palace choirs and imperial dishes from the Hermitage's storerooms, which the cheating guests beat on the floor. The parliamentary commission of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR checked the allegations spread by someone’s hand and found out that the wedding consisted of 12 people, it took place at the cottage of G.V. Romanov, who practically did not participate in it, because there was a certain conflict in the family. The rumor about museum dishes was not confirmed either. M.S. Gorbachev was informed of the results of the audit, was invited to publish them in the press, but no consent was obtained. Then a provocative rumor was launched about G.V. Romanov’s weakness for alcohol. A joke was told in all the offices: they asked the Armenian radio what had changed in Russia since the seventeenth year. Answer: “Nothing. They trade in Yeliseyevsky, dance in the Mariinsky, and Romanov rules. ” He was short in stature, physically strong, and very energetic. The West was wary of him. On March 11, 1985, at a meeting of the Politburo discussing the election of the Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee, he spoke in favor of M. S. Gorbachev: “He began with grassroots work in the Komsomol, then the party organization. And here his quality of the organizer and leader of the masses was manifested. I can say from my previous work that the party activist highly appreciates the activity of M. S. Gorbachev. He is an erudite person ... In his work, Mikhail Sergeyevich is very demanding. But his exactingness is combined with active help to people, with trust in them. Therefore, I believe that he will fully ensure the continuity of the leadership in our party and will completely cope with the responsibilities that will be assigned to him ”(TSKhSD. F. 89. Collection of declassified documents). According to V.I. Vorotnikov, M.S. Gorbachev on 05/13/1985 phoned him and started a conversation about the shortcomings in the work of the defense department of the Central Committee, led by G.V. Romanov: “There are many complaints from the heads of large design bureaus and defense factories. There was a thorough discussion about this. After all, he, as Secretary of the Central Committee, oversees the defense industry. But he does not have good contacts with defense ministries. There are personal complaints to him - regarding incorrect behavior in some foreign trips. I will raise the question of replacing it. ” Three months after the election of M. S. Gorbachev, the General Secretary was retired “in connection with his state of health”. M. S. Gorbachev directly told him that there was no place for him in the leadership and that it was better to resolve this issue on a voluntary basis, without bringing the matter to a discussion in the Politburo. He took it very painfully, but wrote a statement. At a meeting of the Politburo on 05/23/1985, which discussed his statement, he was not present. Members of the Politburo supported the proposal for the resignation of colleagues. They understood: these two could not get along in the Politburo. Undeservedly offended and offended, he did not fight against slander, moved away from social and political life. He was distinguished by modesty and neatness in personal behavior. He became a victim of the struggle for the arrangement of key figures in the upper echelon of power and the elimination of possible applicants, in which not only domestic special services acted. Member of the Supreme Council of the USSR 7-11th convocations. Hero of Socialist Labor (1983).
Three names of the leaders of the Leningrad Communists will forever remain in the national memory: Sergei Mironovich Kirov, Andrey Andreevich Zhdanov and Grigory Vasilyevich Romanov. The further the time separates us from those years when G.V. was at the head of the Leningrad party organization Romanov, the more aware of the scale of his personality. It was a major state talent, a creator.
One of many is one of us.
The story of Romanov’s personality is noteworthy in that at first it seems typical of many in Soviet times. Atypicality begins with the manifestation of his remarkable mind by the organizer, who is able to realize the state significance of the current work, like everyone else's, and raise it to the highest possible level. Organizational talent at all times is a rare occurrence. He singled out Romanov among many.
But back to the typical. He was born in the village of Zikhnovo, Borovichi district, Petrograd province (now Borovichi district of the Novgorod region) into a large peasant family. Was her youngest, sixth child. In 1938 he graduated with honors from a junior high school and even before that he joined the Komsomol. In the same year he entered the Leningrad Shipbuilding College. As you can see, the Stalinist slogan “Cadres who have mastered technology, decide everything!” Did not pass over the fifteen-year-old Grigory Romanov. But he didn’t have time to graduate from college - the war broke out ...
He fought from bell to bell, from 1941 to 1945. In September 1944, he joined the party at the front. He was shell-shocked and awarded two medals - "For the Defense of Leningrad" (1942) and "For Military Merit" (1944).
At the end of the war, he returned to college and in 1946 he defended his diploma with honors, received the specialty of a shipbuilder technician. Sent to work in TsKB-53 Shipbuilding Plant named after A.A. Zhdanova (now “Severnaya Verf”). This is where Romanov’s professionalism and organizational abilities declared themselves, as stated in the description: “he proved himself to be a technically competent designer and was promoted from an ordinary designer to the position of lead designer and then head of the sector”. He worked and studied at the evening department of the Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute. He graduated in 1953 with a degree in shipbuilding engineer. Thirty years - everything is ahead ...
And, in general, a typical biography of a young Soviet man is a war veteran. Yes, I attracted attention with my professional culture, organizational abilities, will and determination. But there were many.
Claimed by time
The eccentricity of Romanov’s personality, his promotion to the ranks of the few with organizational, managerial talent, and state thinking — all this became apparent with the transition of Grigory Vasilievich to party work. In 1954, he was elected secretary of the party committee of the plant. A.A. Zhdanova. At thirty-five years old (mature youth!) Romanov is the first secretary of the Kirovsky district committee of the Leningrad party.
Those like him were in demand then time - the time of scientific, technical and social progress in the USSR. In the 60s and 70s of the twentieth century, the CPSU, in order to remain the leading force of Soviet society, was obliged to nominate well-trained party cadres — cadres competent in the organization of science-intensive production — to command positions (in the management of the production sphere, first of all). And besides, they know firsthand those who know firsthand and social needs and aspirations of ordinary industrialists, those who were called ordinary Soviet people. In other words, the party, as always, at the new stage of socialist construction needed cadres who had passed the school of highly skilled labor, tested for personal responsibility for the decisions taken, proved their ability to manage with knowledge and in the best way and received the confidence of the party and non-partisans. Romanov fully met these requirements. Moreover, he was unusually talented, intelligent and, as they said about him, devilishly efficient and completely disinterested. His rapid rise to the top of the party leadership of Leningrad was not accidental: in 1961 he was elected secretary of the Leningrad City Committee, in 1962 - secretary of the regional committee of the party, in 1963 - his second secretary.
Those were the years of Khrushchev voluntarism, which Grigory Vasilievich did not like to recall. He passed in silence, which is understandable: alien to the hasty hasty solution to the issues of organizing production, he, a producer to the marrow of bones, preferred not to talk about the time at which he had to protect, as far as possible, the Leningrad industry (he was responsible for it from the regional committee) from hectic innovations. What was the cost of only one restructuring of party organs according to the production principle: division into industrial and rural committees ?! But this was a kind of valuable experience for Romanov: he, as they say, sensed adventurism, incompetence for a mile and a half and did not allow those who suffered from these vices to party leadership.
The first
September 16, 1970 there was a turning point in the life of Grigory Vasilyevich - he was elected first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU. He was in his forty-eighth year - the time for the flowering of his personality! ..
For thirteen years, Romanov headed one of the largest organizations of the CPSU, numbering 497 thousand communists by 1983. Over the course of these thirteen years, his creative nature has been revealed in full force. His name received all-Union fame. They started talking about him abroad as well.
Present at least a sketch of all the polysyllabic and diverse activities of G.V. Romanov when he was his first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee is impossible within the boundaries of one essay. The author did not set such a task for himself. But I will try to talk about the outstanding affairs of the great Leningrader.
The first among them is the creation of large industrial and scientific-production associations, which allowed us to effectively develop and implement new technologies. And the main thing is to combine science with production at the time of the scientific and technological revolution. In the sixties of the last century alone, nine industrial production associations were formed in Leningrad, which covered 43 industrial enterprises and 14 research, design and technological organizations. There were no associations like LOMO, Svetlana, Elektrosila by the nineties in the West (yes!), And they are unlikely to be there today. Romanov stood at the origins of this epoch-making endeavor, while still being secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee. In the seventies, thanks to his will and ability to see future production, it received a dynamic development. By the end of the eighties in Leningrad and the region there were already 161 industrial, scientific-industrial and industrial-technical associations. They accounted for 70% of the total output of the Leningrad industry. Yes, what - high-tech! More than one and a half thousand new types of machines and devices have been created, including those that have no analogues in the world. An electric power association manufactured a turbo-generator with a capacity of 1 million 200 thousand kilowatts. In LOMO - a unique optical telescope with a mirror with a diameter of 6 meters. The capitalist West did not know such masterpieces of industrial production.
Romanov in one of the conversations with me (and there were many of them: when I was a deputy of the State Duma in 1995-1999, I often met with Grigory Vasilyevich in his Moscow apartment) said: “It's a lie that we were far behind the West in scientific technically. In many ways, they were ahead - in electronics, instrument engineering, turbine engineering, and not only. We needed time to transfer our achievements in the defense industry to the rails of people's lives. We have started this. And they would have pulled ahead if not for the Gorbachev “perestroika”.
Romanov was one of the few who sought and found a specific way to combine the advantages of a planned socialist economy with the achievements of scientific and technological progress. This was the essence of creating powerful research and production associations. It is clear that the leading ones were concentrated in the military-industrial complex (MIC), it is the nerve of the whole economy. USA, the whole West was very worried. After the ill-fated "perestroika", they did not fail to take a hand in removing the named nerve: with feverish privatization, powerful military-industrial complex associations were put into the spray. The pain that Romanov experienced when it came to the tragedy of the Leningrad industry is beyond words. You should have seen his eyes ...
The city and the region considered a common home
Another great work of the first secretary of the Leningrad regional committee was the development of a comprehensive plan for the economic and social development of Leningrad and the region for the X five-year plan (1976-1980). Its main link was the same plan for the development of specific production. Industrial enterprises began to be overgrown with institutions of social and cultural purposes, with all the infrastructure for the life support of their workers, which is now completely finished (everything that was done in the name of a person was destroyed in the name of the profit of the owner-owner). Large industrial associations financed the construction of kindergartens, nurseries, houses of culture and rest, sanatoriums, hospitals and dispensaries. Housing construction was unfolded for workers and their families.
Romanov better than others learned the Stalinist truth: cadres decide everything. I learned it because I realized: it’s not only a matter of training and retraining of personnel. It also consists in creating socio-economic conditions for their fruitful activities.
The experience of integrated planning, born in Leningrad, was widely used in the country and was enshrined in the 1977 Constitution of the USSR.
Under Romanov, the strategic objective for the five millionth city was also solved: Leningrad began to be provided with basic foodstuffs (meat, milk, butter, egg, vegetables) produced in the agriculture of the Leningrad Region. To solve this problem was extremely difficult in the very adverse climatic conditions of the North-West. First of all, it was necessary to create a powerful material and technical base. The experience of creating large production associations was useful for this. With the support of Romanov and under his care, they appeared and gained strength in the Leningrad Region: the association of greenhouse state farms "Summer" (1971), the industrial complex for cattle fattening "Pashsky", pig-breeding complex "Vostochny" (1973).
I note that at a time when Romanov was the first secretary of the regional committee, in agricultural production not only strictly, but the growth of the livestock was tightly controlled. Its decline was regarded as causing damage to strategic food resources (and what today? Who thinks about these resources, and is there any?).
The oblasts keep a good memory of the exacting first secretary. From the memoirs of the villagers about him: “We all knew Romanov. He was a strict and zealous host. The region did not give offense to anyone. The city and region was considered a common home. In a word - the owner. ”
For the benefit of the working class
And yet, the most significant of all the acts of Romanov, it seems to me, was his work aimed at replenishing the working class of Leningrad with professionally trained personnel. He was the first Soviet politician to recognize the acuteness of this problem during the period of dynamic development of scientific and technological progress. And the first he saw the way to solve it through the formation of a system of vocational schools based on general secondary education. Cadres decide everything. But in the case when the workforce is well educated, cultural, intelligent. Without a general secondary education, they cannot be like that. Romanov approached the solution of the problem not as a pragmatic technocrat, as he is often represented by ill-wishers, but as a statesman and party leader who had passed the apprenticeship school in the production team.
Grigory Vasilievich told me how he convinced the country's leadership of the need to transfer vocational schools to train workers with only secondary education. Involuntarily demonstrated not only his ability to think strategically, but also tactically correctly pursue his strategic line. He recalled: “Before I went to Brezhnev, I asked for an appointment with Suslov. And he began to prove to him that the question of vocational schools with secondary education was a question about the future of the working class, about its leading role. The issue is primarily political. I see - he understands me, agrees, supports. Well, with his support, it’s easier to speak with Leonid Ilyich. After all, this is a serious matter, requiring very significant material costs. The Ministry of Finance resisted. And the Politburo did not all agree. Brezhnev listened to me carefully, agreed. The issue was resolved at the Politburo. ”
Leningrad was the first city in which the transition of vocational schools to secondary education was completed by the end of the seventies. There was no shortage of high words about the leading role of the working class in the party press and in oral propaganda. Romanov never competed with anyone in eloquence, he was restrained in words. He created the conditions for the materialization of the claimed great idea. It took time, 10-15 years, for a new generation of workers to be formed and strengthened, who had undergone vocational training on the basis of secondary education. But tragic events for the country (“perestroika” according to Gorbachev and “reforms” according to Yeltsin) stopped the Soviet era and interrupted it.
Slander
Romanov’s time was interrupted - the time of creation, creation of the new, breakthrough into the future. He became an increasingly prominent figure in the political horizon: since 1973 - a candidate for membership and since 1976 - a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, since 1983 - secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (left Leningrad, moved to Moscow). In the West, they were taking a closer look at him. Former President of France Valerie Giscard d’Estaing in the book "Power and Life" (1990), recalling his meeting with Romanov in the summer of 1973, noted that he was different from the others in the Soviet leadership by "ease, clear sharpness of mind."
Western analysts and Soviet scientists saw this well and made efforts to ensure that the myth of the “Leningrad dictator” as a gray man, limited, suppressing the slightest dissent, appeared in the USSR. Our dissident intelligentsia picked up this myth, accompanying it with slander. The most common slander is about the alleged use by Grigory Vasilievich's family of an old service from the Hermitage. The statement by the director of the Hermitage, academician Piotrovsky, that this was not and could not be, anti-Soviet "intellectuals" did not heed. Still, they could not forgive Romanov for his love of Russian and Soviet classics and, in particular, for his respect for the Leningrad State Academic Drama Theater named after A.S. Pushkin and his artistic director Igor Gorbachev.
But the intellectuals of the anti-Soviet are silent in every way possible. She happened at the end of the play in one of the drama theaters popular in Leningrad. Grigory Vasilievich watched the performance and came to the actors to thank them for the talented game. One of them, a very famous one, turned to him: “Grigory Vasilyevich, you are our benefactor. I’m asking you with the lowest request: zemstvos, zemstvos would be for me to give. Romanov’s reaction was instant: “You are being forgotten. I don’t sell land. ”
Antipode Gorbachev
After the death of the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPSU K.U. Chernenko Romanov was a real candidate for the main role in the party. He learned about the death of the Secretary General on television (a day later than it happened), while on vacation in Sochi, where he was almost forcibly deported by M. Gorbachev, who practically acted as General Secretary of the Party Central Committee during the period of Chernenko’s illness. With great difficulty, Grigory Vasilievich flew to Moscow - the flight of the aircraft for some reason (?) Was delayed. He arrived at the Politburo meeting when the question of electing the Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee was already decided. There were no supporters of Romanov, Shcherbitsky and Kunaev, at this meeting. The reasons for their absence were also well organized by the Gorbachev team: the first was allegedly detained in the USA, where necessary, where he was sent; the second was notified of the death of the Secretary General late. At the suggestion of A. Gromyko, one candidate was put forward for the upcoming plenary meeting of the Central Committee - Mikhail Gorbachev.
Gorbachev saw his antipode in Romanov, but of course he was not able to admit it. In the characterization of the rebellious Leningrader, he attributed to him what he himself suffered: limitation and treachery. Speaking of a man of great talent, Gorbachev argued that from him "it was rarely possible to wait for a practical thought." Gray always avenges talent.
In July 1985, the plenum of the Central Committee released G.V. Romanov "from the duties of a member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in connection with the retirement due to health reasons." Everyone understood everything: Gorbachev was in a hurry to get rid of his antipode in the party leadership. Is 62 years old for a politician? Grigory Vasilievich was full of strength and desire to work for the good of the party and people. He turned to the Secretary General with a request to restore him to party work, but was refused. Gorbachev wrote in his memoirs: "Having met with Romanov, I quite frankly made it clear that for him there is no place in the leadership."
To whom there was a place, we know well.
Stoic courage
As heroism is an alternative to betrayal, and creation to destruction, so Grigory Romanov was an alternative to Mikhail Gorbachev. In the West, they were well aware of this, as Alexander Zinoviev wrote: “Brezhnev was sick. His days were numbered. Other members of the Politburo are also sick old people. Romanov and Gorbachev began to appear as future leaders of the party ... Having studied thoroughly the qualities of both (and perhaps somehow “hooking” Gorbachev earlier), they decided to eliminate Romanov and clear the way for Gorbachev in the relevant Western services. Slander against Romanov was invented and launched in the mass media ... ”And then A. Zinoviev said that in reproach to us Communists this was a shameful page in the history of the CPSU:“ The inventors of slander were sure that Romanov’s “comrades-in-arms” didn’t will protect. And so it happened ... Nobody came out in defense of Romanov. ” The cowardice and indifference in the party pave the way for shameless insolence and betrayal in it, which happened. This is a moral lesson to us. Forgetting it means losing conscience.
Grigory Vasilievich was seriously worried about his insecurity. After his retirement, for a long time, almost the entire “perestroika”, he remained isolated from the party. Few called him and rarely came, with the exception of his most faithful friends. He was under the supervision of spies Gorbachev. Romanov stoically, courageously, having the honor, withstood the political and moral blockade. Not bent, not broken, not embittered. Preserved strength of mind and clarity of mind. He was not only a political, but also a moral alternative to Gorbachev.
Romanov adhered to a Puritan lifestyle. Together with a family of six, he lived in a three-room apartment. He did not tolerate and did not forgive his passion for materialism. Smolny directly told the party officials: “Who wants to buy a car and build a summer cottage - please. But first write a letter of resignation. " Grigory Vasilievich was ready for the vicissitudes of fate and never complained about her. I didn’t complain to anyone, I didn’t ask anyone about anything. He was a proud man, independent to scrupulousness. He knew how to keep the blow. In the "perestroika" he remained rebellious and unconquered. The same can be said about the subsequent times of Romanov’s life.
Legendary person
Grigory Vasilievich became a member of the Communist Party immediately after its II (recovery) congress. He created a community of Leningrad residents in Moscow and led it until the last day of his life. He provided invaluable assistance to the Leningrad Regional Organization of the Communist Party in the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation in 1995. He called and wrote to his colleagues about many years of work in the city and the region, where he was remembered more and more often. More than once I witnessed how people at a rally, in an electric train, in a store said that they had seen Romanov in the city or in the region. I knew that this could not be: Grigory Vasilievich did not leave Moscow, because his wife was unwell for a long time. I did not try to reassure my comrades, because I understood: they “saw” him because they really wanted to see him. We wanted order, confidence in the future. Romanov was for Leningraders a symbol of the spirit of the Soviet era, when everything was as it should and as needed. Was for them a symbol of faith, and therefore they saw him. He became a living legend. People like him are not forgotten among the people, just as they do not forget happiness and joy. They remember not only great things connected with his name, but also his always confident voice, his simplicity, sincerity and openness in communicating with others.
Remember his humanity and nobility. His strict exactingness, about which there were legends: strict, yes fair; in the first place, it does not spare itself and does not give anyone a descent, in a word - Man!
Leningrad, which became the city of the beautiful, heroic fate of Romanov, the city to which he gave everything he had - talent, soul, selfless work - will never forget him. Leningrad will always be grateful to him.
Who is Grigory Romanov?
Among the old communists and everyone who greatly regrets the collapse of the USSR and the collapse of Soviet power, Grigory Romanov is the very savior and hero who could save everything. It is believed that he would draw a conservative line, tighten the screws and continue Brezhnev’s work, prolonging the “Age of Stagnation”. Moreover, he really was a very real contender for power and, "according to rumors," the favorite of Yuri Andropov. Since 1976, he was part of the Politburo. Known, however, Romanov was not at all this, but the thirteen years of managing the "cradle of the Revolution" - Leningrad. There is a period from 1970 to 1983. sometimes called the Romanov era.
Romanov was considered a strong business executive and persecutor of dissent
Estimates of Romanov's activity diverge. Range: from “stormy delights” to “complete nightmare”, from “outstanding organizer” to “persecutor of all living things”. What is customary to credit Romanov as the head of the Leningrad Regional Committee? The rapid development of the metro (19 new stations were opened), the beginning of the construction of a dam to protect the city from flooding (completed in 2011), as well as the launch of the Leningrad nuclear power plant, the appearance of the Kirovets tractor and the Arctic icebreaker.
On the other hand, his name was associated with the persecution of all dissent, and especially with the persecution of all those cultural figures who were not eager to share the party line. Many musicians, writers, poets had a hard time. Romanov is considered almost personally responsible for the fact that the USSR had to leave Joseph Brodsky and Sergei Dovlatov. Political scientist and journalist Boris Vishnevsky even called Romanov “Apostle of Stagnation”. Paradoxically, in 1981, precisely under Romanov, the first rock club in the Soviet Union opened in Leningrad.
Grigory Romanov
If all this is compared, a typical Soviet leader will come out for himself. "Strong business executive" who does not tolerate when something goes against his plans. Another thing is that in terms of nomenclature Romanov was successful. And in the Politburo he was considered almost the main contender for power, especially since the Union entered into the "five-year magnificent funeral." One by one, the bison of Soviet politics were dying: Kosygin, Suslov, Brezhnev himself, then Pelshe, Rashidov. Andropov’s death hour was drawing near. Romanov was eight years older than Gorbachev, but much younger than the Brezhnev gerontocrats.
Andropov wanted Romanov to succeed him
It was believed that Andropov really wanted to be replaced by the Romanov general secretary. Apparently, at that moment, the position of the head of the Leningrad Regional Committee was really stronger than ever. But then the Politburo did not dare to go for rejuvenation. Secretary General elected Konstantin Chernenko, who descended into the coffin. He spent about 13 months as head of state. Chernenko spent most of this time in the hospital. A couple of times for him, right at the hospital, they held visiting meetings of the Politburo. Chernenko died in March 1985, Gorbachev was appointed chairman of the funeral commission. This is a landmark post. Soviet citizens are already accustomed to the fact that the commission for organizing the funeral of the Secretary General is headed by the future Secretary General. So it happened this time. After this, Romanov’s career began to decline. Already on July 1 he was removed from the Politburo, having removed from the post of Secretary of the Central Committee. His place was taken by Eduard Shevarnadze.
Could it be otherwise?
It could, but earlier. It is believed that in the winter of 1984, when Andropov died, Romanov was much stronger than in the spring of 1985, when Chernenko died. For 13 months, the wind has changed. The most influential members of the Politburo either initially did not really like Romanov, or were disappointed in him over the same year with a little. Another important circumstance, which, of course, may be a mere coincidence. At the time of the death of Chernenko, Romanov was not in Moscow. The Secretary of the Central Committee was on vacation in Palanga. That is, the whole struggle for power took place without his participation. And was there a fight at all?
Konstantin Chernenko
The Afghan war would go on, the Berlin Wall would remain in place
After the death of Andropov, the country was left without a secretary general for almost four days. Andropov died on February 9, and Chernenko took office only on the 13th. In the case of Gorbachev, everything happened much faster. Chernenko died on March 10. Already on the 11th the name of the new Secretary General was announced. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko personally lobbied for Gorbachev’s candidacy, a very influential and authoritative person. Whether someone lobbied the 85th Romanov in March is unknown. But, apparently, he learned about Chernenko’s death only when the Politburo had already decided on the choice of receiver. The main supporter of Romanov was Andropov. That is, in February 1984, Romanov had a real chance to lead the country, and in the spring of 1985 - no longer.
What would be?
It is difficult to say what would have happened, but we can say for sure what would not have happened. There would be no Perestroika, reforms, cooperatives, warming in relations with the West and so on. The Afghan war would go on all the way (although it is difficult to judge where the emphasis is), the Berlin Wall would remain in its place and divide the city in half. The USSR would fasten all buttons and, with the strain of all resources, would try to preserve the empire at all costs. The emphasis in such situations is on the ideological front. The culture would be clamped with a steel vice. No rock wave to you. In this regard, Romanov would do the same as Chernenko did - he would choke.
Residents of the GDR dismantle the Berlin Wall
How would the Union solve the problems of falling oil prices? Tightening belts and distraction. Romanov loved to build. The union would be engaged in some large-scale construction project. Perhaps they would remember the idea of \u200b\u200bturning Siberian rivers. But the collapse would have happened anyway. Only not in the early 90s, but a dozen years later. The union gave a crack that you can’t hide in the foundation of a grand construction project. And as soon as this crack became visible to the naked eye, the local elite would pull the republics apart. Romanov could delay this moment for 8-10 years. That's all.
The problem is that G. Romanov was not even considered as a likely candidate for the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee after the death of Yu. Andropov on February 9, 1984. There was generally no struggle there, and no other candidates besides Chernenko were offered and they didn’t consider it - Chernenko, who was the second person in the leadership under Andropov, held a meeting of the Politburo on February 10, stood up and offered to resolve the issue of a new general secretary. Immediately made one of the oldest in age and position of members of the party areopagus - chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N. Tikhonov and proposed him, Chernenko, the candidacy. Everyone supported and elected him, despite the fact that it was already known that Chernenko was seriously, mortally ill.
There is a story about as if Andropov saw M. Gorbachev as his successor. But she is doubtful.
Severely ill and foreboding an imminent demise, Andropov allegedly wanted to repeat the “successor” operation, which L. Brezhnev performed about 1.5 years earlier. In May 1982, after the death of the all-powerful M. Suslov, the party’s chief ideologist and member of the Central Committee’s Politburo since Stalin, Brezhnev transferred Andropov from the KGB of the USSR and made him, in fact, the second person in the party and state — the Central Committee secretary, who led the meetings and the Politburo ( and this was the main body of state power in the USSR), and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Everyone (primarily in the nomenclature) realized that Andropov was the heir. Brezhnev retired and on Andropov all the levers of governing the country closed. Therefore, his election in November 1982 as the new general secretary after Brezhnev’s death only formalized the real state of affairs. For the first time in Soviet history, the transfer of power took place painlessly, according to a pre-staged scenario.
According to the testimony of A. Volsky, a former assistant to the secretary general, in December 1983 Andropov, in connection with the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, held without his participation on December 29, allegedly included an insert in his report at this Plenum with a request that Gorbachev hold meetings of the Secretariat during his illness.In the then Kremlin language, this meant defining a successor. However, in the final text of the report distributed to the members of the Central Committee and to the participants in the Plenum, a fragment with this request was missing. All documents for the Politburo and Plenums at that time previously passed through the apparatus of K. Chernenko - General Department of the Central Committee. At this bureaucratic stage, this phrase, sort of, disappeared.
It is difficult to say how true this is, since there is no other evidence that the will of the powerful party leader was ignored even during his lifetime, the question was not something extraordinary, but a matter of principle, one of the most important - about the next leader. Failure to comply with such an important instruction of the Secretary General should have led to serious proceedings and consequences, but nothing is known about them.
Moreover, Chernenko was formally the second person, he led meetings of the Politburo and the Secretariat - he was elected to this position at the proposal of Andropov himself. In order to replace him with Gorbachev according to the rules that were in force then, it was necessary to contact not the Plenum, which didn’t solve such issues on its own, but the Politburo, submit the corresponding question to the meeting, gather your strength and come to this meeting yourself or hold it in your house in Kuntsevo hospital. At a minimum, it was necessary to call the members of the Politburo, inform them of such a desire, and listen to their opinion. However, nothing of the kind has been done.
The plenum, and this is about 300-350 people representing the highest nomenclature in the country (with the exception of a couple of other workers and milkmaids who were elected there for the sake of the appearance of internal party democracy), did not elect anyone - he only approved the proposal adopted before this in the Politburo.
Gorbachev - then he was not yet 53 years old - he was the youngest member of the Politburo. Of course, he had an internal ambition and claimed to be elected secretary general. But the unspoken principle of seniority worked hard at the Politburo. Among the members of the Politburo, despite the formal equality, those who were older in age and length of stay in the party leadership had more hardware weight. When considering issues at the Politburo, they could object and upset those who were younger. The latter were not entitled to object to the older ones - this would be a monstrous and unforgivable offense. When members of the Politburo appeared in public — party congresses, Central Committee plenary meetings, ceremonial meetings — they clearly followed the order of exit and seating.
The "bench" of the senior members of the Politburo was impressive - N. Tikhonov, who replaced the recently deceased Kosygin as head of government, Defense Minister D. Ustinov, also, like Suslov, in the leadership from Stalin times, K. Chernenko, who led the entire party apparatus, Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1957 A. Gromyko, head of Moscow V. Grishin, leader of Ukraine V. Shcherbitsky. The long-term leader of Kazakhstan D.Kunaev, by virtue of his nationality, did not apply for the post of Secretary General himself and did not have a chance to be elected.
There was no struggle at the Politburo meeting on February 10, everything was decided amicably. Chernenko turned out to be the figure that caused the least irritation of all. And the order had to be respected. They decided on that.
Under these conditions, Gorbachev could not simply raise his hand and say: “I offer myself.” So things were not done. Someone had to support him, but there was nobody.
Nor could Romanov do this - his position in the Politburo was even weaker than that of Gorbachev.
Romanov, the first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU, was one of the "young" and could not claim anything in graters of senior comrades. He was clearly inferior to Gorbachev - if we choose between the "young" - in intellectual and organizational abilities. Gorbachev for some reason perceived him as his rival in March 1985 during the new elections after Chernenko’s death, but then he, Gorbachev, already gained a lot of political weight and became Chernenko’s second person in the leadership. In addition, the position of Gromyko, who had by then become the oldest member of the Politburo (Tikhonov and Ustinov had passed away), also played a large role.
What would happen if Romanov was elected? It’s hard to say something specific. Almost nothing was known about him, even in nomenclature circles. - traits of his character, way of thinking, not to mention some ideas, which is indicative of the real situation of a person in the structure of power. Romanov was considered a "conservative", i.e. a man who firmly believed in communist principles and was ready to withstand any changes. After transferring him from the Leningrad Regional Committee to Moscow, he as Secretary of the Central Committee oversaw the military-industrial complex, those. this is some version of the current curator of this complex - Comrade Rogozin. In general, that’s it. It would probably be bad - “tightening the screws”, tightening the system and the same crisis, only without the prospect of overcoming it in the form of alternatives Gorbachev discovered - a market in the economy and democracy in politics.
Petersburg Vice Governor Viktor Lobko: "Grigory Romanov was a true citizen of Russia"
Vice Governor of St. Petersburg expressed his condolences on the death of the former first secretary of the Leningrad regional committee of the CPSU . According to the correspondentIA REGNUM Lobko noted that "all Petersburgers know the name of Romanov, since he played a very significant role in the history of this city." “He was a real citizen of Russia,” the official said.
According to Lobko, precisely during the period of leadership of the city of Romanov, "the most rapid growth of housing construction occurred, when people were taken out of the slums." "There was also dawn in many cultural areas. It is unfortunate that he was gone. He lived for the city, the country. Romanov was a very talented and capable organizer," Lobko said.
Today, June 3, in St. Petersburg, on the 86th year of his life, statesman Grigory Romanov passed away.
From September 1970 to 1983, Grigory Romanov was the first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU, and from 1971 - a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
In St. Petersburg, the former head of Leningrad Grigory Romanov (http://www.regnum.ru/news/1009470.html )
NEWSru.com :: In Russia
Grigory Romanov, the failed successor to Secretary General Brezhnev, died on the 86th year of his life
In St. Petersburg, died at 86Grigory Romanov , Soviet party and statesman, who for many years was the first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU.
He was called one of the most influential politicians of the Soviet era. Romanov’s character was sharp and tough, many even compared him to Stalin. And the time of his reign, Petersburgers called the "police regime."
Romanov led the Leningrad regional committee of the party for 15 years. From 1970 to 1985 - under the Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko.
Not tall, very arrogant, he established strict ideological control over the city. The liberal intelligentsia despised him. First of all, due to the powerful pressure on cultural figures. As reminds"Echo of Moscow" Arkady Raikin could not stand the constant pressure of the Leningrad authorities and, together with his theater, was forced to move to Moscow. And the writer Daniil Granin, already in the years of perestroika, wrote an ironic novel in which a stunted regional leader turns from a constant lie into a dwarf. Everyone immediately recognized in this hero Grigory Romanov.
There were many rumors about Romanov - about his connection with the popular singer Lyudmila Senchina, although she herself denies this, abouthis daughter's wedding in the Tauride Palace with dishes from the Hermitage. Then for several years the society was noisy discussing the service broken up by the guests from the Hermitage, and then it turned out that there was no service and wedding in the palace. But it became clear after the intensity of popular indignation reached its limit.
At the turn of the 80s, Romanov was unofficially considered one of the possible candidates for the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee. Back in 1975, an American magazineNewsweek called him the most likely successor to Leonid Brezhnev. However, Mikhail Gorbachev won the power struggle in March 1985, and Romanov was retired.
According to Fontanka.ru , recently Romanov lived in the country, he did not write memoirs. On February 7, 2008, he celebrated his 85th birthday. The place of the funeral of Grigory Romanov is not yet reported.
Wedding in the Tauride and Kremlin wars
At the end of the XVIII century, Prince Potemkin arranged magnificent receptions for several thousand people in the Catherine Hall of the Tauride Palace. Empress Catherine herself was a frequent guest. When in the eighties of the twentieth century, Leningrad and the whole USSR spread the news that the first secretary of the party’s regional committee had arranged for his daughter’s wedding in Tauride and had taken the tsar’s service “for rent” and hadn’t returned half of it, letters were scattered in the Politburo from angry communists.
Sensation issued by German magazineSpiegel . Radio Liberty and Voice of America retold the article. The rumor of a wedding spread overnight. Romanov was silent, considering it incorrect to comment on foreign gossip. Soviet newspapers did not write about it, they say"News."
“Andropov said this to me: do not pay attention. We know that there was nothing of the kind. I say: Yuri Vladimirovich, but you can give information about what did not exist!” “Well, we will figure it out,” Romanov recalled.
Natalia, the youngest daughter of Grigory Romanov, still lives in St. Petersburg. Interview does not fundamentally. According to her husband, there were only 10 people at their wedding in 1974, which excited the imagination of thousands of workers. The celebration was very modest. “This, of course, is stupidity. The wedding was at the cottage. By the way, it was a state cottage. And the next day we left by boat along the Volga. We traveled. There was no Tauride. And there was no Hermitage,” recalls Lev Radchenko.
When the scandal with the mythical wedding subsided, Romanov took up Leningrad. For 10 years, almost 100 million square meters of housing have been built in the city. Leningrad "master" noticed. Such an active regional leader set up a center.
“He had an exceptional relationship with Brezhnev. Somewhere two or three years before Brezhnev’s death, he had a very good relationship. He trusted him very much. He called Leningrad and home,” recalls Valentin’s second daughter, Romanova. But the location of the Secretary General, Romanov did not use it for long.
However, in 1983 he was invited to Moscow. The new general secretary, Yuri Andropov, instructed him to oversee the military-industrial complex. But next to Andropov, the second secretary Mikhail Gorbachev began to appear more and more often - he was entrusted with agriculture. Gorbachev also enjoyed the explicit support of the next general, Konstantin Chernenko.
"The relationship was strained between them. We all felt it. And Gorbachev used different methods to not directly, but somehow indirectly present it in a negative form," said the former head of the Council of Ministers, Vitaly Vorotnikov, about the relationship between Gorbachev and Romanov.
When Chernenko passed away, Romanov was in the Baltic states. Two other members of the Politburo were also absent. But they decided not to wait and hold an emergency plenum. No one doubted that the next general secretary would be the one who would be supported by the most influential person in the Politburo - Andrei Gromyko.
Egor Ligachev undertook to persuade him. “On the eve of the opening of the plenum, Gromyko called me. And he says: Yegor Kuzmich, who will we elect the secretary general? I told him: we need Gorbachev. He says: I also think that we need Gorbachev. But tell me, who could make this proposal? I say: best to you, Andrei Andreyevich. He says: I also think that I need to make an offer, "Ligachev recalls.
Relations with Gorbachev and his entourage did not work out for Romanov. He left the political scene. The official wording is of their own free will and state of health. But the "wedding" story haunted even pensioner Romanov. Before the election of the first president of the USSR, the Supreme Council even created a commission and conducted its own investigation. But they did not find anything reprehensible.
Help: Grigory Romanov
Grigory Vasilyevich Romanov was born in the village of Zikhnovo, now the Vorovichsky district of the Novgorod region. Member of the CPSU since 1944. Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1976-1985); candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee (1973-1976), secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (1983-1985), member of the CPSU Central Committee (1966-1986).
Member of the Great Patriotic War; since 1946 he worked as a designer, head of sector of the Central Design Bureau of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry; in 1953 he graduated in absentia from the Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute; 1954-1961 - Secretary of the party committee of the plant, secretary, first secretary of the Kirov district committee of the party of Leningrad;
1961-1963 - Secretary of the Leningrad City Committee, Secretary of the Regional Party Committee; 1963-1970 - second secretary, 1970-1983 - first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU; was elected as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 7-11th convocations; Hero of Socialist Labor; since 1985 - retired.
Grigory Romanov was awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, Orders of the Red Banner of Labor, "Badge of Honor" and medals.
Petersburgers owe Romanov the start of the construction of the famous dam designed to protect the city from floods, and the development of the metro - 19 stations were built during this period.
Updated on 2008-06-03 at 13:06:33
The inevitable happened - the rival of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU Grigory Romanov died
Grigory Romanov, the former first secretary of the Leningrad regional committee of the CPSU, a Soviet party and statesman, died in St. Petersburg at the 86th year of his life. Recently, he lived in the country, he did not write memoirs. On February 7, 2008, he celebrated his 85th birthday.
Grigory Romanov led the Leningrad party organization from 1970 to 1985, when Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko were at the head of the country. Petersburgers owe him the start of the construction of the famous dam designed to protect the city from flooding, and the development of the metro - 19 stations were built during this period.
In the early 80s, Romanov was read to the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In 1983, he became Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, but immediately after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, he was retired.
Romanov Grigory Vasilievich was born on February 7, 1923 in the village of Zikhnovo, now the Vorovichsky district of the Novgorod region.
Member of the CPSU since 1944.
A candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee from 1973 to 1976.
Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU from 1976 to 1985.
Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee from 1983 to 1985.
Member of the Central Committee of the CPSU from 1966 to 1986.
Member of the Great Patriotic War; Since 1946 he worked as a designer, head of the sector of the Central Design Bureau of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry. In 1953 he graduated in absentia from the Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute; 1954-1961 - Secretary of the party committee of the plant, secretary, first secretary of the Kirov district committee of the party of Leningrad; 1961-1963 - Secretary of the Leningrad City Committee, Secretary of the Regional Party Committee; 1963-1970 - second secretary, 1970-1983 - first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU; was elected as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 7-11th convocations; Hero of Socialist Labor. Since 1985 - retired. .
Romanov was the party leader of Leningrad in 1970-1985, when Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko were at the head of the state.
In the late 70s and early 80s, he was unofficially considered one of the possible candidates for the post of head of the Soviet state.
Romanov became one of the iconic figures of the era of stagnation, "famous for" tough measures to establish ideological control over the city he led.
Among the figures of culture and art who were forced to leave Leningrad due to powerful ideological pressure were Arkady Raikin and Sergey Yursky.
Grigory Romanov was retired in the summer of 1985, a few months after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power.